Necessity and rigidly designating kind terms

Philosophical Studies 119 (3):243-264 (2004)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Kripke claims that certainkind terms, particularly natural kind terms,are, like names, rigid designators. However,kind terms are more complicated than names aseach is connected both to a principle ofinclusion and an extension. So, there is aquestion regarding what it is that rigidlydesignating kind terms rigidly designate. Inthis paper, I assume that there are rigidlydesignating kind terms and attempt to answerthe question as to what it is that they rigidlydesignate. I then use this analysis of rigidlydesignating kind terms to show how Kripke''sreasoning regarding the necessity of `Hesperusis Phosphorus'' can be extended to statementsinvolving kind terms like `Water is H2O''and `Tigers are mammals''.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Rigid Application.Michael Devitt - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 125 (2):139-165.
Rigid Kind Terms.Jussi Haukioja - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 39:55-61.
Are General Terms Rigid?Nathan Salmon - 2004 - Linguistics and Philosophy 28 (1):117 - 134.
Against rigidity for natural kind terms.Stephen P. Schwartz - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 12):2957-2971.
Mill and Kripke on Proper Names and Natural Kind Terms.Stephen P. Schwartz - 2013 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (5):925 - 945.
Natural phenomenon terms.Richard Gray - 2006 - Analysis 66 (2):141-148.
De Jure Rigidity.Nicolien Janssens - 2018 - Aporia 18 (1):9-18.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
140 (#311,031)

6 months
12 (#1,011,021)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references