Split-brain cases

In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider, The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. New York: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 634–647 (2008)
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Abstract

After the first callosotomy surgeries were performed, the general consensus among the medical community was that severing the corpus callosum had relatively little, if any, effect on an individual's behavior. Nearly twenty years later, researchers discovered that, under experimental conditions, the two hemispheres could simultaneously maintain very different interpretations of the same stimulus. These findings immediately called into question the unity of subjective experience, a fundamental characteristic of human consciousness. How could the split‐brain patient not experience any disruption in his experience as a unified self when the two hemispheres are physically and functionally disconnected? In this chapter, we review the research that has led to a conceptualization of the split brain as two minds within one body and the implications of this research for the scientific study of consciousness. We argue that consciousness is a neural function that emerges from the integration of information across available functional modules.

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edition Colvin, Mary; Marinsek, Nicole L.; Miller, Michael B.; Gazzaniga, Michael S. (2017) "Split‐brain Cases". In Schneider, Susan, Velmans, Max, The Blackwell companion to consciousness, pp. 634–647: Wiley (2017)

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