Abstract

Computational creativity has gained in the recent years momentum as an established interdisciplinary field, whose aim is to investigate, design and foster artificial creativity. This article analyses whether artificial outputs can appear to as being creative and assesses thus computational creativity from the standpoint of the receiver. While taking Boden’s distinction between several forms of creativity as a starting point, I argue that creativity implies besides surprise and value an additional essential feature, namely the creative intention, not only from the standpoint of the creator but also of the receiver. Following the notion that I propose, creative intention cannot be identified to the mere absence of randomness, but implies the possibility of interpreting the intention, as well as volition and the expression of personal lived experiences. Subsequently I reflect on the possibility of attributing creativity to computer programs while being aware of their lack of creative intention. I argue that the best solution for this purpose is considering computer programs as co-creative partners, which can be credited as contributors to the creative process. In my conclusive remarks, I assess the implications of this possibility for the notion of creative subject. More precisely, I raise the question whether the latter should necessarily be linked to the notion of creativity, and hence, whether co-creative artificial programs should necessarily be considered as creative subjects.