Abstract

The passions occupy an uncomfortable position in Descartes’ philosophical anthropology: not only do they seem to live somewhere in between the mind and the body, but they also seem to straddle the divide between active volitions and passive perceptions. On top of this, commentators have struggled to determine whether the passions play a representational role in the mind or a purely motivational one. This paper addresses these interpretative issues by showing that Cartesian passions are what Tamar Schapiro calls inclinations, emotions that incline us to perform mental actions. By providing a more accurate picture of the passions, the paper also challenges the popular idea that the Cartesian passions help unify or reveal the unity of Descartes’ human being, an idea that looks to mitigate the criticism that Descartes offers a starkly dualistic anthropology. This paper argues that, to the contrary, Descartes’ conception of the passions exposes his thought to precisely this criticism, reinforcing his dualism and promoting an alienated, mechanical perspective on the mind.