Rational Reflection

Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):121-140 (2010)
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Abstract

This paper explores an initially attractive principle connecting beliefs in general with beliefs about what beliefs are rational. The principle turns out to be violated by intuitively rational beliefs in some situations. The paper lays out some options for reacting to this fact.

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2010-12-30

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David Christensen
Brown University

Citations of this work

Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):314-345.
Epistemic modesty defended.David Christensen - 2013 - In David Christensen & Jennifer Lackey, The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 77–97.
Evidence: A Guide for the Uncertain.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (3):586-632.

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References found in this work

Quotation.Herman Cappelen, Ernest Lepore & Matthew McKeever - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield, Disagreement. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 111–174.
Higher Order Evidence.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):185-215.
Peer disagreement and higher order evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2011 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb, Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 183--217.

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