Abstract

This paper continues a critical inquiry into political ideological hypocrisy by shifting the focus from institutions and doctrines to the deeper psychological structure of action itself. While modern political life often treats power, dominance, and self-assertion as natural expressions of human reality, this study questions whether such pursuits can genuinely answer the human desire for fulfillment and happiness. Drawing on Arthur Schopenhauer’s distinction between the objectification of the will and the identity of the will, the paper argues that political hypocrisy is not merely a moral failure but a structural outcome of ego-centered action. When political agency is driven by the need to secure and assert the self, ideals inevitably become instruments of justification rather than expressions of shared responsibility. To explore an alternative mode of action, the study brings Schopenhauer’s insights into dialogue with key concepts from the Daodejing, especially 無爲 (non-forcing action) and 自然 (naturalness). Rather than interpreting 無爲 as passivity or withdrawal, the paper understands it as action free from artificial manipulation—action that arises when the ego no longer stands at the center of decision-making. In this sense, 無爲 appears as the political expression of the identity of the will. The historical example of Admiral Yi Sun-sin provides a concrete illustration of this orientation. His leadership demonstrates how effective action, responsibility, and courage can emerge without self-display or ideological performance. Through this comparative framework, the paper argues that power cannot answer the question of true happiness because happiness does not arise from domination or control, but from the quieting of egoic striving. Ultimately, the study proposes a non-egoic vision of political life grounded not in new ideological systems, but in a transformation of the agent who acts. A politics beyond ideological hypocrisy, it suggests, begins where the ego’s need to dominate gives way to a deeper recognition of shared existence.