Abstract

Husserl recognized the question of the possibility of object in general as the common de jure problem of knowledge for Kant and himself. By insisting that object must be “received” (Kant) or “self-given” (Husserl), both philosophers turned to intuition as the focal point of their inquiry. However, concerning the actual function and range of intuition, their views grew apart. Kant restricted intuition to sensibility, thus erecting the barrier between phenomenal and noumenal world. Husserl, on the other hand, held essence inseparable from fact. Accordingly, intuition crosses over from a merely receptive function of fact to “ideate” or grasp the essence of fact and factual world. Husserl’s intuition is not only “intellectualized,” but also expanded in such a way as to make the division between concept and sensibility—even theory and practice questionable.