An empirical investigation of reasoning with legal cases through theory construction and application

Artificial Intelligence and Law 13 (3-4):323-371 (2005)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In recent years several proposals to view reasoning with legal cases as theory construction have been advanced. The most detailed of these is that of Bench-Capon and Sartor, which uses facts, rules, values and preferences to build a theory designed to explain the decisions in a set of cases. In this paper we describe CATE (CAse Theory Editor), a tool intended to support the construction of theories as described by Bench-Capon and Sartor, and which produces executable code corresponding to a theory. CATE has been used in a series of experiments intended to explore a number of issues relating to such theories, including how the theories should be constructed, how sets of values should be compared, and the representation of cases using structured values as opposed to factors.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

HYPO's legacy: introduction to the virtual special issue.T. J. M. Bench-Capon - 2017 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 25 (2):205-250.
Representing Popov v Hayashi with dimensions and factors.T. J. M. Bench-Capon - 2012 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 20 (1):15-35.
An improved factor based approach to precedential constraint.Adam Rigoni - 2015 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 23 (2):133-160.
Representing dimensions within the reason model of precedent.Adam Rigoni - 2018 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 26 (1):1-22.
Accommodating change.Latifa Al-Abdulkarim, Katie Atkinson & Trevor Bench-Capon - 2016 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 24 (4):409-427.
Knowledge Construction in Legal Reasoning: A Three Stage Model of Law’s Evolution in Practical Discourse.Olaf Tans - 2018 - International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue Internationale de Sémiotique Juridique 31 (1):1-19.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
160 (#260,408)

6 months
33 (#271,197)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?