Social choice, the strong Pareto principle, and conditional decisiveness

Theory and Decision 75 (4):563-579 (2013)
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Abstract

This paper examines social choice theory with the strong Pareto principle. The notion of conditional decisiveness is introduced to clarify the underlying power structure behind strongly Paretian aggregation rules satisfying binary independence. We discuss the various degrees of social rationality: transitivity, semi-transitivity, the interval-order property, quasi-transitivity, and acyclicity.

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Susumu Cato
University of Tokyo

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References found in this work

Social Choice and Individual Values.Irving M. Copi - 1952 - Science and Society 16 (2):181-181.
Social Choice and Individual Values.Kenneth Joseph Arrow - 1951 - New York, NY, USA: Wiley: New York.
Social choice and the arrow conditions.Allan F. Gibbard - 2014 - Economics and Philosophy 30 (3):269-284.

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