Revisionary intellectualism and Gettier

Philosophical Studies 172 (1):7-27 (2015)
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Abstract

How should intellectualists respond to apparent Gettier-style counterexamples? Stanley offers an orthodox response which rejects the claim that the subjects in such scenarios possess knowledge-how. I argue that intellectualists should embrace a revisionary response according to which knowledge-how is a distinctively practical species of knowledge-that that is compatible with Gettier-style luck.

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10.1007/s11098-013-0263-y

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Yuri Cath
La Trobe University

Citations of this work

Know-how as Competence. A Rylean Responsibilist Account.David Löwenstein - 2017 - Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
Know-how, action, and luck.Carlotta Pavese - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1595-1617.
Knowledge, practical knowledge, and intentional action.Joshua Shepherd & J. Adam Carter - 2023 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9:556-583.
Knowledge-How, Abilities, and Questions.Joshua Habgood-Coote - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):86-104.
Knowing How.Yuri Cath - 2019 - Analysis 79 (3):487-503.

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References found in this work

The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 2000 - New York: University Of Chicago Press.
Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2007 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
Know How.Jason Stanley - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

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