Thickness Is More Than Affective Valence: Evaluative Language Through the Lenses of Psycholinguistics

Cognitive Science 50 (2):e70180 (2026)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Thick terms like “courageous,” “smart,” and “tasty” combine description and evaluation, contrasting with purely evaluative terms like “good” and “bad,” and descriptive terms like “Italian” and “green.” Thick terms intuitively constitute a special class of evaluative language; but we currently do not know whether the psycholinguistic effects of these terms are reducible to known semantic dimensions. Here, we start to systematically explore this question by comparing the behavior of thick terms and non‐thick descriptive terms with similar affective valence, which is a strong candidate semantic dimension to account for differences between evaluative and non‐evaluative language. We study thick terms from English, Dutch, and Italian, combining behavioral data from the cancellability task, Cloze task, and free association networks, with natural language processing methods and psycholinguistic ratings of word valence. We find that thick and non‐thick descriptive terms are associated with different psycholinguistic effects, even when carefully matched for valence, suggesting that valence is insufficient to account for the difference between thick and non‐thick terms. Instead, we find no reliable difference between positive and negative thick terms, and between moral, epistemic, and aesthetic thick terms. Our findings indicate that thick terms form a homogeneous class of evaluative language whose psycholingusitic effects cannot be explained only in terms of affective valence.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2026-02-03

Downloads
38 (#1,419,230)

6 months
38 (#219,846)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Emotions, Value, and Agency.Christine Tappolet - 2016 - Oxford: Oxford University Press UK.
Freedom and Reason.R. M. Hare - 1965 - Oxford, GB: Oxford Paperbacks.

View all 31 references / Add more references