Abstract

Philosopher Hilary Putnam maintains that a classical form of realism and a countervailing antirealist tendency are the components of an entrenched philosophical dichotomy. The dichotomy's realist component is metaphysical realism: its antirealist component is relativism. Within the context of a critique of this entrenched dichotomy, Putnam develops a philosophical picture that he has called 'internal realism'. ;Putnam's development of his philosophical picture may be regarded as consisting of a negative program and a positive program. This bifurcation does not correspond to separate phases of the development, however, Putnam undertakes both programs at once. His negative objective is to show that both metaphysical realism and relativism are incoherent. His positive objective is to develop a workable alternative to both metaphysical realism and relativism, which are, he acknowledges, pictures that philosophers have embraced for compelling reasons. ;I offer a three-part exposition and defense of Putnam's development of internal realism, which, I argue, might more appropriately be called 'pluralistic realism'. In Part I, I present and elaborate upon Putnam's characterizations of metaphysical realism and relativism, and I discuss his rationale for regarding these positions as defining an entrenched philosophical dichotomy. In Part II, I argue that Putnam's negative program succeeds. I present his arguments against metaphysical realism and relativism, and I defend them against the attacks of such critics as Richard Rorty, Alvin Goldman, Michael Devitt, and Crispin Wright. In Part III, I show how the basis of Putnam's new picture develops in light of his negative program and through his reflections in other contexts. I close with some remarks about Putnam's efforts, past and present, to begin the process of building a full-fledged philosophical picture upon that basis. ;My own philosophical contribution is primarily an exposition that presents Putnam's enterprise systematically and corrects misreadings that are more or less common in the work of his critics. The objections of some such critics evaporate with the exposure of the misconceptions that substantiate them; other objections I attack head on. In addition, I offer what I hope will strike readers as insight useful for the direction of further development of Putnam's pluralistic realism.