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Why Theories of Concepts Should Not Ignore the Problem of Acquisition
Disputatio 7 (41):113-163 (2015)
Abstract
Why Theories of Concepts Should Not Ignore the Problem of Acquisition.Other Versions
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Citations of this work
Bootstrapping Concepts via Hybridization: A Step-by-step Guide.Matteo De Benedetto & Nina Poth - 2025 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 16 (3).
The Computational Origin of Representation.Steven T. Piantadosi - 2020 - Minds and Machines 31 (1):1-58.
Don't trust Fodor's guide in Monte Carlo: Learning concepts by hypothesis testing without circularity.Michael Deigan - 2023 - Mind and Language 38 (2):355-373.
The Epistemology of Rational Constructivism.Mark Fedyk & Fei Xu - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (2):343-362.
Are Sensory Concepts Learned by “Abstraction” from Experience?Pär Sundström - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (5):1159-1178.
References found in this work
The meaning of 'meaning'.Hilary Putnam - 1975 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7:131-193.
Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong.Jerry A. Fodor - 1998 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
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