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Free Will and Consciousness: A Determinist Account of the Illusion of Free Will
Lexington Books (2013)
Abstract
This book argues two main things: The first is that there is no such thing as free will—at least not in the sense most ordinary folk take to be central or fundamental; the second is that the strong and pervasive belief in free will can be accounted for through a careful analysis of our phenomenology and a proper theoretical understanding of consciousness.Author's Profile
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Gregg D. Caruso: Free Will and Consciousness: A Determinist Account of the Illusion of Free Will: Lexington Books, 2013 , xiii+299, $43.99, ISBN: 978-0-7391-8440-0. [REVIEW]Erika Torres & David Fajardo-Chica - 2013 - Minds and Machines 23 (4):519-522.
Free Will, Justice and Illusion.Saul Smilansky - 1990 - Dissertation, University of Oxford (United Kingdom)
Are we free?: psychology and free will.John Baer, James C. Kaufman & Roy F. Baumeister (eds.) - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Free will: The positive role of illusion.Saul Smilansky - 1999 - In The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 2: Metaphysics. Bowling Green: Philosophy Doc Ctr. pp. 143-152.
Introduction: Exploring the Illusion of Free Will and Moral Responsibility.Gregg Caruso - 2013 - In Susan Blackmore, Thomas W. Clark, Mark Hallett, John-Dylan Haynes, Ted Honderich, Neil Levy, Thomas Nadelhoffer, Shaun Nichols, Michael Pauen, Derk Pereboom, Susan Pockett, Maureen Sie, Saul Smilansky, Galen Strawson, Daniela Goya Tocchetto, Manuel Vargas, Benjamin Vilhauer & Bruce Waller, Exploring the Illusion of Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
Free Will.Saul Smilansky - 1999 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 2:143-152.
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Citations of this work
Free will.Timothy O'Connor & Christopher Evan Franklin - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Free Will Skepticism and Criminal Behavior: A Public Health-Quarantine Model.Gregg D. Caruso - 2016 - Southwest Philosophy Review 32 (1):25-48.
Hard-Incompatibilist Existentialism: Neuroscience, Punishment, and Meaning in Life.Derk Pereboom & Gregg D. Caruso - 2018 - In Gregg Caruso & Owen Flanagan, Neuroexistentialism: Meaning, Morals, and Purpose in the Age of Neuroscience. New York, US: OUP Usa.
Compatibilism and Retributivist Desert Moral Responsibility: On What is of Central Philosophical and Practical Importance.Gregg D. Caruso & Stephen G. Morris - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (4):837-855.
References found in this work
Is Belief in Free Will a Cultural Universal?Hagop Sarkissian, Amita Chatterjee, Felipe de Brigard, Joshua Knobe, Shaun Nichols & Smita Sirker - 2010 - Mind and Language 25 (3):346-358.
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