Distinctively human thinking

In Peter Carruthers & Jill Boucher, Language and Thought: Interdisciplinary Themes. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 69 (1998)
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Abstract

This chapter takes up, and sketches an answer to, the main challenge facing massively modular theories of the architecture of the human mind. This is to account for the distinctively flexible, non-domain-specific, character of much human thinking. I shall show how the appearance of a modular language faculty within an evolving modular architecture might have led to these distinctive features of human thinking with only minor further additions and non-domain-specific adaptations.

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Peter Carruthers
University of Maryland, College Park

Citations of this work

On Fodor's problem.Peter Carruthers - 2003 - Mind and Language 18 (5):502-523.
Moderately massive modularity.Peter Carruthers - 2003 - In Anthony O'Hear, Minds and Persons. Cambridge University Press. pp. 67-89.
Language as a cognitive tool.Marco Mirolli & Domenico Parisi - 2009 - Minds and Machines 19 (4):517-528.
Moderately Massive Modularity.Peter Carruthers - 2003 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 53:67-89.

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