Assertion and hypothesis: a logical framework for their opposition relations

Logic Journal of the IGPL 25 (2):131-144 (2017)
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Abstract

Following the speech act theory, we take hypotheses and assertions as linguistic acts with different illocutionary forces. We assume that a hypothesis is justified if there is at least a scintilla of evidence for the truth of its propositional content, while an assertion is justified when there is conclusive evidence that its propositional content is true. Here we extend the logical treatment for assertions given by Dalla Pozza and Garola by outlining a pragmatic logic for assertions and hypotheses. On the basis of this extension we analyse the standard logical opposition relations for assertions and hypotheses. We formulate a pragmatic square of oppositions for assertions and a hexagon of oppositions for hypotheses. Finally, we give a mixed hexagon of oppositions to point out the opposition relations for assertions and hypotheses.

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Author Profiles

Massimiliano Carrara
University of Padua
Daniele Chiffi
Politecnico di Milano
Ciro De Florio
Università Cattolica di Milano

References found in this work

How to do things with words.John L. Austin - 1962 - Oxford [Eng.]: Clarendon Press. Edited by Marina Sbisá & J. O. Urmson.
Foundations of Illocutionary Logic.John Rogers Searle & Daniel Vanderveken - 1985 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
Sur l'opposition des concepts.Robert Blanche - 1953 - Theoria 19 (3):89-130.
Dual-Intuitionistic Logic.Igor Urbas - 1996 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 37 (3):440-451.

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