The Inessential Indexical: On the Philosophical Insignificance of Perspective and the First Person

Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. Edited by Josh Dever (2013)
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Abstract

Cappelen and Dever present a forceful challenge to the standard view that perspective, and in particular the perspective of the first person, is a philosophically deep aspect of the world. Their goal is not to show that we need to explain indexical and other perspectival phenomena in different ways, but to show that the entire topic is an illusion.

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Author Profiles

Herman Cappelen
University of Hong Kong
Josh Dever
University of Texas at Austin

Citations of this work

First-Person Propositions.Michael Caie & Dilip Ninan - 2025 - Philosophers' Imprint 25.
Eight Arguments for First‐Person Realism.David Builes - 2024 - Philosophy Compass 19 (1):e12959.
The Polysemy of 'I'.Susanna Schellenberg - 2025 - Mind and Language 1:1-19.

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