Replies to Weatherson, Chalmers, Weinberg, and Bengson

Philosophical Studies 171 (3):577-600 (2014)
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Abstract

Reply to criticsThe replies in this symposium are some of the most insightful contributions to contemporary metaphilosophy I have read. I wish I had seen them before I wrote Philosophy without Intuitions. It would have made it a better book. I also wish I had space to explore all the important issues raised, but unfortunately, the focus here will have to be on points of disagreement. The replies build on each other—I draw on material from the earlier replies in the later ones. It is possible to read each reply in isolation, but they are best read in sequence.Socratic knowledge and its role in philosophy: Reply to WeathersonWeatherson presents one of the most interesting accounts of the role of intuitions in philosophy that I have encountered. For Weatherson, the role is limited, fragile, and elusive.One of the most interesting ideas in the paper is that “the important intuitions are the ones you bar..

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Herman Cappelen
University of Hong Kong

Citations of this work

Mischaracterization Reconsidered.Joachim Horvath - 2026 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
The intuition deniers.Jennifer Nado - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (3):781-800.
Reply to Boghossian, Brogaard and Richard.Herman Cappelen - 2014 - Analytic Philosophy 55 (4):407-421.
The threat of the intuition-shaped hole.Ethan Landes - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (4):539-564.

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References found in this work

Philosophy without Intuitions.Herman Cappelen - 2012 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
Naming and Necessity: Lectures Given to the Princeton University Philosophy Colloquium.Saul Aaron Kripke - 1980 - Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Edited by Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel.
Two Dogmas of Empiricism.W. Quine - 1951 - [Longmans, Green].
Elusive knowledge.David Lewis - 1996 - Cambridge University Press. Edited by Keith DeRose & Ted A. Warfield.
Two Dogmas of Empiricism.Willard V. O. Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.

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