Troubles with trivialism

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 50 (6):655 – 667 (2007)
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Abstract

According to the trivialist, everything is true. But why would anyone believe that? It turns out that trivialism emerges naturally from a certain inconsistency view of language, and it has significant benefits that need to be acknowledged. But trivialism also encounters some troubles along the way. After discussing them, I sketch a couple of alternatives that can preserve the benefits of trivialism without the corresponding costs.

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Otávio Bueno
University of Miami

Citations of this work

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Inconsistency in natural languages.Jody Azzouni - 2013 - Synthese 190 (15):3175-3184.
Observations on the Trivial World.Zach Weber & Hitoshi Omori - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (5):975-994.
Inferential Role and the Ideal of Deductive Logic.Thomas Hofweber - 2009 - The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 5.

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References found in this work

Logic, semantics, metamathematics.Alfred Tarski - 1956 - Oxford,: Clarendon Press. Edited by John Corcoran & J. H. Woodger.
Doubt truth to be a liar.Graham Priest - 2006 - New York: Oxford University Press.
In Contradiction.Graham Priest - 2006 - Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press.

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