Abstract

This article proposes a new model of bicameral sortition democracy that rethinks the division of labor between elected and randomly selected bodies. Existing bicameral proposals either give sortition chambers weak or co-equal authority, limiting their ability to realize the epistemic promise of deliberative democracy. By contrast, I propose a model in which an elected chamber sets the legislative agenda and oversees deliberative fairness, while a sortition chamber holds exclusive authority to deliberate and decide policy. This design preserves the communicative and authorization functions of elections, while securing the epistemic advantages of cognitively diverse citizen deliberation. I evaluate this model against three alternatives, pure sortition, co-equal bicameralism, and subordinate sortition bicameralism, along four normative dimensions: resistance to elite capture, representation and inclusion, epistemic quality, and legitimacy and accountability. I argue that only a model that empowers citizens in their ‘post-learning’ capacity, while grounding decisions in a democratically visible and contestable process, can deliver a political system that is both legitimate and epistemically robust.