On something and nothing: The interface of two types of nothing

Abstract

We suggest that the question of why is there something rather than nothing can be answered by the existence of two types of nothing. We propose that matter occurs at the boundaries of intersection of both nothings. This accords with the common view that there are three worlds; the platonic world of concepts, the material world (i.e. of matter), and the non-material world (i.e. of consciousness). Both the material and non-material worlds have their own type of nothing, thus leading to the proposal. The interpretation provides an alternative type of duality distinct from property or substance dualism, and may unify the two. The interpretation also has implications for the understanding of physical causation, and Mach's principle as the boundary of intersection provides a return to the aether concept.

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2025-08-11

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Adam Brownstein
University of Queensland

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References found in this work

Facing up to the problem of consciousness.David Chalmers - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3):200-19.
Quanta and Qualia.Adrian Kent - 2018 - Foundations of Physics 48 (9):1021-1037.

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