Externalist moral realism

Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (S1):23-41 (1986)
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Abstract

SOME THINK THAT MORAL REALISTS CANNOT RECOGNIZE THE PRACTICAL OR ACTION-GUIDING CHARACTER OF MORALITY AND SO REJECT MORAL REALISM. THIS FORM OF ANTI-REALISM DEPENDS UPON AN INTERNALIST MORAL PSYCHOLOGY. BUT AN EXTERNALIST MORAL PSYCHOLOGY IS MORE PLAUSIBLE AND ALLOWS THE REALIST A SENSIBLE EXPLANATION OF THE ACTION-GUIDING CHARACTER OF MORALITY. CONSIDERATION OF THE PRACTICAL CHARACTER OF MORALITY, THEREFORE, DOES NOT UNDERMINE AND, INDEED, SUPPORTS MORAL REALISM.

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reprint Brink, David O. (2010) "Externalist Moral Realism". Southern Journal of Philosophy 24(S1):23-41

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David Brink
University of California, San Diego

References found in this work

Morality as a system of hypothetical imperatives.Philippa Foot - 1972 - Philosophical Review 81 (3):305-316.
Why Should I Be Moral?Kai Nielsen - 1963 - Methodos 15 (59-60):275-306.
Moral Arguments.Philippa Foot - 1997 - In Virtues and Vices. Wiley-Blackwell.

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