Scepticism about philosophy

Ratio 23 (1):1-16 (2010)
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Abstract

Suppose a person who is agnostic about most philosophical issues wishes to have true philosophical beliefs but equally wishes to avoid false philosophical beliefs. I argue that this truth-seeking, error-avoiding agnostic would not have good grounds for pursuing philosophy. Widespread disagreement shows that pursuing philosophy is not a reliable method of discovering true answers to philosophical questions. More likely than not, pursuing philosophy leads to false belief. Many attempts to rebut this sceptical argument fail.

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2009-05-28

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Jason Brennan
Georgetown University

Citations of this work

Philosophy Without Belief.Zach Barnett - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):109-138.
Understanding Philosophy.Michael Hannon & James Nguyen - 2026 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
Philosophical Progress, Skepticism, and Disagreement.Annalisa Coliva & Louis Doulas - 2024 - In Maria Baghramian, J. Adam Carter & Rach Cosker-Rowland, Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Disagreement. New York, NY: Routledge.

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Quotation.Herman Cappelen, Ernest Lepore & Matthew McKeever - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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