A Relative Improvement

Phronesis 59 (3):246-271 (2014)
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Abstract

The Mode of Relativity in Agrippa’s Five Modes does not fit with the other four modes, and disrupts an otherwise elegant system. We argue that it is not the familiar argument from epistemic relativism, but a formal condition on the structure of justifications: the principle that epistemic grounding relations cannot be reflexive. This understanding of Agrippan Relativity leads to a better understanding of the Modes of Hypothesis and Reciprocity, a clearer outline of the structure of Agrippa’s system as a whole, and a new insight into the Two Modes that follow the Five.

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Citations of this work

Agrippan Problems.Robb Dunphy - 2020 - Logos and Episteme 11 (3):259-282.
Skeptical Suspension in the Face of Disagreement.Joseph B. Bullock - 2025 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 107 (2):212-240.
Sextus Empiricus.Benjamin Morison - 2014 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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What The Tortoise Said To Achilles.Lewis Carroll - 1895 - Mind 104 (416):691-693.
Diogenes Laertius: Lives of Eminent Philosophers.Tiziano Dorandi (ed.) - 2013 - Cambridge University Press.
The Modes of Scepticism: Ancient Texts and Modern Interpretations.Julia Annas & Jonathan Barnes - 1985 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Jonathan Barnes.
The Oxford handbook of skepticism.John Greco (ed.) - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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