Homeostasis, Higher Taxa, and Monophyly

Philosophy of Science 77 (5):686-701 (2010)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Several authors have argued that higher taxa are monophyletic homeostatic property cluster natural kinds. On the traditional definition of monophyly, this will not work: the emergence of taxon-defining homeostatic property clusters would not always correspond to unique speciation events. An alternative conception of monophyly is developed and advocated, which can accommodate the homeostatic property cluster proposal. Recent work in philosophy of science shows that it meets appropriate standards of objectivity and precision.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Monophyly, paraphyly, and natural kinds.Olivier Rieppel - 2005 - Biology and Philosophy 20 (2-3):465-487.
Species monophyly.Olivier Rieppel - 2009 - Journal of Zoological Systematics and Evolutionary Research 48 (1):1-8.
Diseases as Homeostatic Property Clusters.Chloé de Canson - 2026 - Philosophy of Medicine 7 (1):1-14.
Los taxones tampoco son racimos homeostáticos de propiedades.Gustavo Caponi - 2017 - Disputatio: Philosophical Research Bulletin 6 (7):323-356.
Scientific kinds.Marc Ereshefsky & Thomas A. C. Reydon - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (4):969-986.
Homeostatic Property Cluster Theory without Homeostatic Mechanisms: Two Recent Attempts and their Costs.Yukinori Onishi & Davide Serpico - 2021 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie (1):61-82.

Analytics

Added to PP
2012-06-29

Downloads
284 (#150,611)

6 months
36 (#243,062)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Kornblith, Naturalism, Relativism.Martin Kusch & Robin McKenna - 2025 - In Luis R. G. Oliveira & Joshua DiPaolo, Kornblith and His Critics. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 21-38.
Indigenous and Scientific Kinds.David Ludwig - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (1).

View all 29 citations / Add more citations