Abstract

This chapter discusses six objections to PEC: that (i) PEC is troubled by the fact that ‘knowledge’-attributions have semantic values in ‘solitary contexts’; (ii) PEC makes it too easy to satisfy ‘knows’ at certain contexts; (iii) our pragmatic presuppositions themselves need to be epistemically justified in order to provide proper foundations for ‘knowledge’; (iv) we can assume a proposition _p_ at a context _C_ without taking it seriously, so PEC is susceptible to an apparent counterexample; (v) some propositions are taken seriously and thus present relevant alternatives at a context _C_, despite the fact that their negations are mutually ‘known’ and thus pragmatically presupposed in _C_; and (vi) PEC has implausible consequences when combined with fairly standard assumptions about the semantics of counterfactual conditionals. This chapter argues that none of these objections results in a serious challenge to PEC.