Abstract

This study proposes to examine the tension in Nietzsche’s works between two competing discourses, i.e., the discourse of theology and the discourse of philology. It argues that, in order to understand Nietzsche’s complicated standpoint and the aim of his Kulturkritik, we have to appreciate how he operates with two different discourses, one indexed to belief, faith, liturgy (i.e., the discourse of theology) and another indexed to analytical reason, sceptical investigation, and logical argumentation, as well as historical context and linguistic precision (i.e., the discourse of philology). Its core thesis is that, in the end, Nietzsche can no longer believe, because he thinks he has uncovered a fraudulent production of meaning in the texts, in a way that is comparable with his insight into the production of morality in On the Genealogy of Morals (1887).