Infinite Regress and Hohfeld: A Comment on Hillel Steiner’s “Directed Duties and Inalienable Rights”

Ethics 126 (1):139-152 (2015)
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Abstract

In his article “Directed Duties and Inalienable Rights,” Hillel Steiner advances an argument to show that there cannot be inalienable rights. This “impossibility theorem,” as well as providing an interesting result by itself, could break the theoretical deadlock in the debate between proponents of interest theory, on the one hand, and proponents of will theory, on the other. In this article, I comment on Steiner’s argument, and I try to show why it does not work. I then expound a paradoxical outcome of the Hohfeldian analytical framework and examine how it might be amended to avoid this outcome.

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Pierfrancesco Biasetti
Leibniz Institute of Zoo and Wildlife Research, Berlin

Citations of this work

Privacy, Interests, and Inalienable Rights.Adam D. Moore - 2018 - Moral Philosophy and Politics 5 (2):327-355.

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References found in this work

A right to do wrong.Jeremy Waldron - 1981 - Ethics 92 (1):21-39.
The Nature of Rights.Leif Wenar - 2005 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 33 (3):223-252.
The nature of rights debate rests on a mistake.Siegfried van Duffel - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (1):104-123.
Why aren't duties rights&quest.Rowan Cruft - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (223):175-192.

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