Knowledge from Forgetting

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 3 (3):525-540 (2017)
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Abstract

This paper provides a novel argument for granting memory the status of a generative source of justification and knowledge. Memory can produce justified output beliefs and knowledge on the basis of unjustified input beliefs alone. The key to understanding how memory can generate justification and knowledge, memory generativism, is to bear in mind that memory frequently omits part of the stored information. The proposed argument depends on a broadly reliabilist approach to justification.

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Author Profiles

Sven Bernecker
University of Cologne
Thomas Grundmann
University of Cologne