Nothing is alive

Think 16 (47):115-125 (2017)
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Abstract

Finding an adequate definition of "life" has proven to be a tricky affair. In this article, I discuss the idea that nothing is really alive: we only say so. I shall argue that 'being alive' is not a genuine property of things, and that it only reflects the way we think and talk about things. An eliminativist strategy will then allow us to free ourselves from the burden of having to find a definition of life, and will allow us to focus on the genuinely interesting properties of living (and non-living) entities.

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Author's Profile

Jiri Benovsky
University of Fribourg

References found in this work

On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 2001 - Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.
Material Beings.Peter van Inwagen - 1990 - Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Objects and Persons.Trenton Merricks - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Material Beings.Peter Van Inwagen - 1990 - Philosophy 67 (259):126-127.

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