Abstract

In the previous two chapters we saw what Neurath’s naturalistic pragmatics of science can do: provide a theory of empirical evidence that ultimately combines the relevant insights of the psychology of perception with the sociology and history of institutionalised collective endeavours with normative directives arrived at in the light of agreed objectives. Let us now turn to Carnap. What contributions might a logician of science be able to make beyond simply analysing the logic of pre-existing scientific theories? Important as that task may be, one must also ask whether Carnap’s logic of science can, in a comparable and complementary way to Neurath’s pragmatics, make a positive contribution towards shaping the future development of scientific practice. The answer, as will be demonstrated, is yes. Carnap’s method of explication allows the logician of science to contribute to the scientific endeavor both and increased awareness of, and consequent deepening, of scientific practice but also the provision of linguistic and logical innovations.