Moral Valence and Semantic Intuitions

Erkenntnis 80 (2):445-466 (2015)
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Abstract

Despite the swirling tide of controversy surrounding the work of Machery et al., the cross-cultural differences they observed in semantic intuitions about the reference of proper names have proven to be robust. In the present article, we report cross-cultural and individual differences in semantic intuitions obtained using new experimental materials. In light of the pervasiveness of the Knobe effect and the fact that Machery et al.’s original materials incorporated elements of wrongdoing but did not control for their influence, we also examined the question of whether the moral valence of actions described in experimental materials might affect participants’ responses. Our results suggest that uncontrolled moral valence did not distort participants’ judgments in previous research. Our findings provide further confirmation of the robustness of cross-cultural and intra-cultural differences in semantic intuitions and strengthen the philosophical challenge that they pose.

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Author Profiles

Ryan Undercoffer
State University of New York (SUNY)
James R. Beebe
University at Buffalo

References found in this work

Naming and Necessity: Lectures Given to the Princeton University Philosophy Colloquium.Saul Aaron Kripke - 1980 - Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Edited by Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Critica 17 (49):69-71.
Naming and Necessity.S. Kripke - 1972 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 45 (4):665-666.
Naming and necessity.Saul Kripke - 2010 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kolbel, Arguing about language. New York: Routledge. pp. 431-433.

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