Abstract

In Menkiti’s Moral Man, Oyowe argues that Menkiti’s persons are “soft persons.” They are different in kind from human beings in that they find their existence in a social ontology, whereas humans find theirs in a natural ontology, but this does not make them any less real. This understanding, Oyowe contends, is consistent with Menkiti’s texts and allows for a satisfying explanation of a possibly problematic relationship between human being and person. He acknowledges that their placement in social ontology makes them (at least partly) conventional entities and so opens Menkiti’s account to some of the threats that face conventionalism, but he goes on to argue that these can be overcome. This article argues against Oyowe that Menkiti’s persons are resistant to the interpretation as soft entities. Though Menkiti continually stresses the importance of the community to personhood, much of what he has to say suggests he ascribes neither to the distinction between social and natural ontology that is central to Oyowe’s interpretation nor to the conventionalism that comes with it. This article argues that the soft-person reading does not solve problems of conventionalism as neatly as Oyowe hopes but that Menkiti’s view is not vulnerable to those problems.