On mixed inferences and pluralism about truth predicates

Philosophical Quarterly 50 (200):380-382 (2000)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)

Other Versions

No versions found

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
502 (#106,805)

6 months
94 (#125,295)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Jc Beall
University of Notre Dame

Citations of this work

Truth and multiple realizability.Michael P. Lynch - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3):384 – 408.
Domains, plural truth, and mixed atomic propositions.Jeremy Wyatt - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (S1):225-236.
Truth pluralism and many-valued logics: A reply to Beall.Christine Tappolet - 2000 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (200):382-385.
Validity for Strong Pluralists.Aaron J. Cotnoir - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):563-579.
“True” as Ambiguous.Max Kölbel - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (2):359-384.

View all 36 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Assertion.Peter Geach - 1965 - Philosophical Review 74 (4):449-465.
Many-valued logic.Nicholas Rescher - 1969 - New York,: McGraw-Hill.
Ascriptivism.P. T. Geach - 1960 - Philosophical Review 69 (2):221-225.
Logical Consequence.J. C. Beall, Greg Restall & Gil Sagi - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Realism, Antirealism, Irrealism, Quasi-Realism.Crispin Wright - 1988 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 12 (1):25-49.

View all 7 references / Add more references