Abstract

This thesis investigates the relationship between conceptions of God and definitions of morality through the frameworks of J. L. Schellenberg’s ultimism and Immanuel Kant’s deontological ethics. Drawing on Socrates’ question in Euthyphro “What makes the pious, pious?” the study asks whether morality derives from divine command or exists independently as a rational, universal order. By situating Kant’s categorical imperative within an ultimistic metaphysics, the thesis argues that morality need not depend on divine decree but instead arises from rational deliberation and free will. An ultimistic God, conceived as the metaphysical ground of transcendental reality, complements rather than dictates moral order, preserving the autonomy of moral agents. This synthesis further suggests that divine omniscience cannot be deterministic, as genuine moral responsibility requires multiple possible futures and the exercise of free choice. The analysis concludes that morality and ultimism, when held in tandem, resolve aspects of the Euthyphro dilemma by affirming morality’s rational independence while grounding it in a transcendental metaphysical framework.