„Wer sich aber zum Wurm macht …“ – Würde als Selbstverpflichtung

Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 66 (5):607-625 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Kant introduces a duty to oneself to respect oneself and to avoid servility – or notto make oneself a worm. I argue for a wider understanding of this duty: Persons ought to respect their own dignity as persons with autonomy, rationality, and morality (A), but also as personalities, who embody dignity and live a dignified life (B). A corresponds to Kant’s concept of duty as the necessity of an action done out of respect for the moral law, B is an obligation arising from the practical necessity that follows from one’s self-understanding as an individual personality in a socio-cultural context. A and B relate to two types of dignity that are discussed in current debates. I argue that both types of dignity are equally relevant for understanding and respecting one’s own dignity. Finally I discuss why, even though persons can behave like worms, others ought not to step on them.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-11-03

Downloads
80 (#711,581)

6 months
13 (#932,908)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Katharina Bauer
Erasmus University Rotterdam

Citations of this work

Kant-Bibliographie 2018.Margit Ruffing - 2020 - Kant Studien 111 (4):647-702.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Dignity, Rank, and Rights.Jeremy Waldron - 2012 - New York, US: Oup Usa. Edited by Meir Dan-Cohen.
Autonomy and self-respect.Thomas Hill - 1991 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Servility and self-respect.Thomas E. Hill - 1973 - The Monist 57 (1):87 - 104.
The Decent Society.Avishai Margalit & Naomi Goldblum - 2001 - Mind 110 (437):229-232.

View all 24 references / Add more references