Is Knowledge Safe?

American Philosophical Quarterly 45 (1):19-30 (2008)
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Abstract

One of the most interesting accounts of knowledge which have been recently proposed is the safety account of knowledge. According to it, one only knows that p if one's true belief that p could not have easily been false: S believes that p ==> p (where "==>" stands for the subjunctive conditional). This paper presents a counter-example and discusses attempts to fix the problem. It turns out that there is a deeper underlying problem which does not allow for a solution that would help the safety theorist. It is not the case that knowledge is safe.

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Peter Baumann
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München

Citations of this work

Modal Virtue Epistemology.Bob Beddor & Carlotta Pavese - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (1):61-79.
Knowledge Under Threat.Tomas Bogardus - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):289-313.
Knowledge First Virtue Epistemology.Christoph Kelp - 2017 - In A. Carter, E. Gordon & B. Jarvis, Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 223-245.
No Luck With Knowledge? On a Dogma of Epistemology.Peter Baumann - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (3):523-551.

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References found in this work

Safety, content, apriority, self-knowledge.David Manley - 2007 - Journal of Philosophy 104 (8):403-423.

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