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Epistemic self-indulgence
In Virtue and Vice, Moral and Epistemic. Malden: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 215–235 (2011)
Abstract
This chapter contains sections titled: Aristotle on Moral Temperance, Self‐Indulgence, and Insensibility Epistemic Temperance, Self‐Indulgence, and Insensibility Acknowledgments References.Author's Profile
epistemic self‐indulgence moral self‐indulgence, a well‐established vice ‐ and epistemic self‐indulgence Aristotle's notion of moral temperance ‐ and vices of self‐indulgence and insensibility Aristotle on moral temperance, self‐indulgence and insensibility ‐ analysis of moral temperance (sophrosune) and vices morally temperate person (MT1) desires, consumes, and enjoys appropriate objects ‐ (MT2) desires, consumes and enjoys at appropriate times and (MT3) desires and consumes Aristotle, temperance and vices to physical pleasures ‐ “temperance and self‐indulgence … concerned with kind of pleasures that other animals share in” inclusion of treats in (MT1), liberal ‐ blurring line between temperance and self‐indulgence epistemic temperance, self‐indulgence and insensibility epistemically temperate, (ET1) desires, consumes, enjoys appropriate epistemic objects ‐ (ET2) desires, consumes and enjoys at appropriate times and (ET3) desires and consumes epistemic desires, common and na
Other Versions
| original | Battaly, Heather (2010) "Epistemic self-indulgence". Metaphilosophy 41(1-2):214-234 |
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Citations of this work
Intellectual Humility: Owning Our Limitations.Dennis Whitcomb, Heather Battaly, Jason Baehr & Daniel Howard-Snyder - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (3):509-539.
Epistemic Corruption and the Research Impact Agenda.Ian James Kidd, Jennifer Chubb & Joshua Forstenzer - 2021 - Theory and Research in Education 19 (2):148-167.
The Teaching Excellence Framework, Epistemic Insensibility and the Question of Purpose.Joshua Forstenzer - 2018 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 52 (3):548-574.
References found in this work
Epistemic injustice: power and the ethics of knowing.Miranda Fricker - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Epistemic akrasia and epistemic virtue.Christopher Hookway - 2001 - In Abrol Fairweather & Linda Zagzebski, Virtue epistemology: essays on epistemic virtue and responsibility. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 178–199.
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