Abstract

Phenomenology transformed the study of mind by challenging the assumption that cognition should be explained through an isolated subject confronting an external world. This paper reconstructs the movement from Edmund Husserl through Martin Heidegger to Maurice Merleau-Ponty as conceptual transformations in the relations among experience, body, and world. Using comparative conceptual reconstruction, it examines how Husserl’s intentionality disclosed the directedness of consciousness and the intentional correlation; how Heidegger’s analysis of being-in-the-world situated understanding within practical involvement; and how Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the lived body grounded perception and agency in embodied engagement. The paper argues that these developments expanded the unit of analysis for understanding mind: from intentional consciousness, through practical world-involvement, to the embodied subject–world relation. This trajectory was not a simple linear progression, since Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty transformed possibilities already present in Husserl’s analyses of intentionality, embodiment, and the lifeworld. The paper considers the significance of this transformation for embodied and situated cognition, 4E approaches, and artificial intelligence. Phenomenology challenges accounts that identify intelligence exclusively with internal information processing, without proving that computation is insufficient or that embodiment necessarily produces experience. It thereby relocates the problem of mind within the structured relations among experience, practical activity, embodiment, and world.