Abstract

My dissertation is concerned with Kant's theory of our experience of objects as presented in his Critique of Pure Reason. I begin by considering two distinct approaches that one can take in analyzing intentional experiences--i.e., experiences of or about things. I note that one may analyze such experiences either in terms of the sorts of things that we can have experience of or in terms of the sorts of experiences that we can have of things. It is my claim that Kant was more concerned with the latter in the Critique, and consequently, I propose a Quinian "denominalization" of Kant's use of the expression 'appearance'. So, I argue, when Kant claims that we can only experience things as they appear and never as they are in themselves, he is saying something about how we experience things, and is not saying that the objects we experience are mere appearances, numerically distinct from things in themselves. I develop this interpretation through a detailed examination of the text, and then utilize it to make sense of some traditionally puzzling passages in the Critique.