Split brains and single minds

Journal of Philosophical Research 16:11-18 (1991)
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Abstract

This paper challenges the widely held theory that split-brain patients have ‘two-minds’ and can thus be described as being two distinct persons. A distinction is made between the singularity of mind and the coherence of mind. It is stressed that ‘a single mind’ is not something posited to explain coherence among mental contents, but is merely a mark that such coherence holds to a certain degree. However, there is no sharp dividing line regarding what counts as a single mind. It is argued that mental coherence is always a matter of degree, and that our concept of a single mind can accomodate spit-brain phenomena.

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James Baillie
University of Portland

Citations of this work

Recent Work on Personal Identity.James Baillie - 1993 - Philosophical Books 34 (4):193-206.

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References found in this work

Unity of consciousness.Paul Raymont & Andy Brook - 2007 - In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter, The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 565--577.

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