Abstract

Abstract This study explores the long-standing philosophical question of whether reality and knowledge are constructed or discovered, analyzing the issue through the lens of constructivist and realist thought. It first outlines the conceptual framework of constructivism, distinguishing between its epistemological and ontological dimensions as well as its various strands, such as social, radical, and biological constructivism. The discussion situates constructivism within realism–anti-realism debates, emphasizing its influence across disciplines like sociology, psychology, and epistemology. In its second part, the article examines the “argument from facticity,” a realist counter-argument developed by philosophers such as Paul Boghossian, Markus Gabriel, and John Searle, which challenges radical or global forms of constructivism. According to this argument, even the most comprehensive constructivist theories presuppose a minimal realist foundation: certain facts must exist independently of human conceptual or linguistic frameworks for any theory, including constructivism itself, to hold coherence. The analysis shows that denying all objective facts results in performative contradictions, as constructivist claims rely on factual presuppositions about their own validity. Through Boghossian’s critique of fact-constructivism, Gabriel’s ontological realism, and Searle’s external realism, the study demonstrates that a minimal commitment to factuality is unavoidable. Ultimately, the “argument from facticity” reveals that any coherent theory of knowledge and reality must presuppose at least a minimal realist ontology to avoid self-refutation. Keywords: Constructivism, Realism, Markus Gabriel, Paul Boghossian, John Searle, Argument from Facticity.