The Wisdom of the Small Crowd: Myside Bias and Group Discussion

Abstract

The my-side bias is a well-documented cognitive bias in the evaluation of arguments, in which reasoners in a discussion tend to overvalue arguments that confirm their prior beliefs, while undervaluing arguments that attack their prior beliefs. The first part of this paper develops and justifies a Bayesian model of myside bias at the level of individual reasoning. In the second part, this Bayesian model is implemented in an agent-based model of group discussion among myside-biased agents. The agent-based model is then used to perform a number of experiments with the objective to study whether the myside bias hinders or enhances the ability of groups to collectively track the truth, that is, to reach the correct answer to a given binary issue. An analysis of the results suggests the following: First, whether the truth-tracking ability of groups is helped or hindered by myside bias crucially depends on how the strength of myside bias is differentially distributed across subgroups of discussants holding different beliefs. Second, small groups are more likely to track the truth than larger groups, suggesting that increasing group size has a detrimental effect on collective truth-tracking through discussion.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The Myside Bias in Argument Evaluation: A Bayesian Model.Edoardo Baccini & Stephan Hartmann - 2022 - Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society 44:1512-1518.
Myside bias in thinking about abortion.Jonathan Baron - 1995 - Thinking and Reasoning 1 (3):221 – 235.

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-07-31

Downloads
795 (#73,038)

6 months
185 (#66,108)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

References found in this work

The Enigma of Reason.Dan Sperber & Hugo Mercier (eds.) - 2017 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University Press.
The structure of empirical knowledge.Laurence BonJour - 1985 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
B.Gottfried Gabriel, Matthias Gatzemeier, Carl F. Gethmann, Peter Janich, Friedrich Kambartel, Kuno Lorenz, Klaus Mainzer, Peter Schroeder-Heister, Christian Thiel, Reiner Wimmer & Martin Carrier - 2024 - In Gottfried Gabriel, Matthias Gatzemeier, Carl F. Gethmann, Peter Janich, Friedrich Kambartel, Kuno Lorenz, Klaus Mainzer, Peter Schroeder-Heister, Christian Thiel, Reiner Wimmer & Martin Carrier, Enzyklopädie Philosophie und Wissenschaftstheorie: Band 1: A–B. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg. pp. 336-560.
Bayesian Epistemology.Luc Bovens & Stephan Hartmann - 2003 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by Stephan Hartmann.

View all 54 references / Add more references