Abstract

This paper examines Spinoza's complex treatment of wonder (admiratio) in relation to his broader philosophical project. While Descartes valorised wonder as a starting point for inquiry, Spinoza critiques it as a cognitive distraction that impedes adequate understanding. This paper shows that Spinoza's reconfiguration of wonder exemplifies his strategy of reinterpreting traditional concepts within a naturalistic framework. By positioning wonder as a byproduct of ignorance and a tool exploited by religious and political authorities, Spinoza critiques Cartesian dualism, theological dogma and the manipulation of human affectivity. Ultimately, this paper demonstrates that Spinoza's nuanced view of wonder is essential for understanding his alternative model of human flourishing, grounded in reason, self‐determination and the intellectual love of God. Spinoza's analysis remains relevant to contemporary debates about secularism, scientific understanding and the human need for meaning.