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Appropriate Belief Without Evidence
Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 2:7-28 (2015)
Abstract
ABSTRACT In this paper I defend a version of Wittgensteininan contextualism. This is a view about justification on which some beliefs are epistemically appropriate because evidence cannot be adduced in their favour. I trace the history of the view from Wittgenstein and Ortega to the present day, defend one version from the charge of relativism, and suggest some applications of the view both within and without philosophy.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Evidentialism and Moral Encroachment.Georgi Gardiner - 2018 - In McCain Kevin, Believing in Accordance with the Evidence: New Essays on Evidentialism. Cham: Springer Verlag. pp. 169-195.
The Case for a Feminist Hinge Epistemology.Natalie Alana Ashton - 2019 - Wittgenstein-Studien 10 (1):153-163.
References found in this work
Justification without awareness: a defense of epistemic externalism.Michael Bergmann - 2006 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Unnatural doubts: epistemological realism and the basis of scepticism.Michael Williams - 1991 - Cambridge, USA: Blackwell.
The Epistemology of Democracy.Elizabeth Anderson - 2006 - Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 3 (1):8-22.
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