Philosophy of Machine Agency: Autonomy and Responsibility in AI

Abstract

As artificial intelligence systems become increasingly autonomous and capable of making complex decisions with minimal human oversight, fundamental questions about agency and moral responsibility demand urgent philosophical examination. This paper argues that machine agency is derivative rather than inherent—AI systems exhibit functional agency through their capacity to act autonomously, but lack the moral agency necessary for direct responsibility attribution. Instead, moral responsibility must be distributed across the socio-technical networks that design, deploy, and oversee these systems. We propose a framework for responsibility allocation based on control and epistemic access, implemented through institutional mechanisms including traceability systems, auditability protocols, responsibility ledgers, and escalation frameworks. This approach preserves human agency while enabling the beneficial deployment of autonomous AI systems in complex social contexts.

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2025-09-08

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