Desires, magnitudes, and orectic penetration

Philosophical Psychology 29 (8):1175-1185 (2016)
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Abstract

Dustin Stokes argues for the existence of orectic penetration, a phenomenon in which a desire-like state penetrates our perceptual experience. His candidate for a case of orectic penetration is the most convincing candidate presented thus far. It is argued here that his candidate and his further arguments for the existence of orectic penetration do not support the claim that orectic penetration takes place. As a result, it is concluded that there are no convincing cases of desire-like states penetrating perceptual experience.

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Valtteri Arstila
University of Turku

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References found in this work

Which Properties Are Represented in Perception.Susanna Siegel - 2006 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne, Perceptual experience. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 481-503.
Cognitive Penetrability of Perception.Dustin Stokes - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (7):646-663.

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