Akratic Thinking

Philosophical Psychology (2025)
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Abstract

Akratic action is voluntarily acting against one’s better judgement. Akratic belief is believing against one’s better judgement. We here provide an account of a phenomena that sits somewhere between the two: ‘akratic thinking’. This is where we engage in a thought process against our better judgement. While the idea of akratic thinking has been tentatively considered before, no account has yet been offered of it. This is what we’ll offer here. Our account will seek to show how akratic thinking is possible, the different forms it can take, and the kind of irrationality involved. We’ll also explore how the notion of akratic thinking can provide an alternative explanation for some ostensible cases of akratic belief, and the implications it may have for our understanding of certain mental disorders.

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Author Profiles

Ed Armitage
Aarhus University
Somogy Varga
Aarhus University

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References found in this work

The Normativity of Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
T. - 2008 - In A. P. Martinich, A Hobbes Dictionary. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 299-304.
The Mind's Construction: The Ontology of Mind and Mental Action.Matthew Soteriou - 2013 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
The Epistemic Innocence of Irrational Beliefs.Lisa Bortolotti - 2020 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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