Abstract

Bringing children to have respect for others is generally regarded as a central task of moral and social education. In this article one particular view of what ‘respect for others’ means and how it is justified is examined critically and found to be unsatisfactory. This view states that ‘respect for others’ follows logically from the proper conceptualization of ‘person’, and claims, as a consequence, that in bringing children to respect others moral educators would be engaged primarily in a cognitive task (ie helping children to acquire the proper concept of a ‘person') ‐‐ and would not have to resort to the conditioning of attitudes or the use of extrinsic motivation. This view is unsatisfactory, it is argued, as it does not give a correct account of the logical relationship between ‘person’ and ‘respect’ ‐‐ and the conclusion is drawn that it has not been shown that moral and social education can be primarily cognitive, in this particular respect. Neither has it been shown that conditioning of attitudes is unnecessary.