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Do Apes Read Minds?: Toward a New Folk Psychology
MIT Press (2012)
Abstract
Andrews argues for a pluralistic folk psychology that employs different kinds of practices and different kinds of cognitive tools (including personality trait attribution, stereotype activation, inductive reasoning about past behavior, and...Author's Profile
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Review of Kristin Andrews' Do Apes Read Minds? Toward a New Folk Psychology. [REVIEW]Neil Van Leeuwen - 2013 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 4.
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Citations of this work
In search of animal normativity: a framework for studying social norms in non-human animals.Evan Westra, Simon Fitzpatrick, Sarah F. Brosnan, Thibaud Gruber, Catherine Hobaiter, Lydia M. Hopper, Daniel Kelly, Christopher Krupenye, Lydia V. Luncz, Jordan Theriault & Kristin Andrews - 2024 - Biological Reviews 1.
The science of belief: A progress report.Nicolas Porot & Eric Mandelbaum - 2021 - WIREs Cognitive Science 12 (2).
A pluralistic framework for the psychology of norms.Evan Westra & Kristin Andrews - 2022 - Biology and Philosophy 37 (5):1-30.
References found in this work
Making things happen: a theory of causal explanation.James Woodward - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1987 - MIT Press. Edited by Margaret A. Boden.
Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind.Evan Thompson - 2007 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
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